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Summary
Proponents of robust mortgage finance regulation would do well to look to the states, and specifically to
the regulatory effects of state-mandated judicial foreclosure. Judicial foreclosure, which is authorized in
almost half of U.S. states, requires that lenders seeking to foreclose on a mortgage file an action in state
court. This not only provides borrowers with a forum for holding lenders accountable for their behavior
and obligations, but puts the onus on the lender to show that the requirements for foreclosure have been
met. It also aids borrowers by delaying the foreclosure process and allowing them to remain in their
homes for longer periods while in default. In this brief, Professor Brian Feinstein empirically examines the
effects of judicial foreclosure on lender behavior and mortgage costs for consumers. The findings
indicate that judicial foreclosure alters lender behavior in ways that are beneficial to borrowers, and that
mirror regulatory goals. Lenders exhibit greater caution in loan-approval decisions and offer fewer
subprime loans. These results are amplified for lower-income borrowers. Importantly, the costs imposed
on lenders by judicial foreclosure do not appear to get passed on to borrowers in the form of higher rates.
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Brian D. Feinstein, JD, PhD

More than a decade after U.S. mortgage lending sparked a global financial crisis,
Washington’s treatment of the mortgage-finance industry has taken
a deregulatory turn.
In the first 21 months of the Trump administration,
activity levels across the federal government—from
CFPB consumer-protection enforcement actions,
to SEC fines against banks, to Justice Department
lending-discrimination lawsuits—are markedly
lower than during the final 21 months of the Obama
administration. Proponents of a robust mortgagefinance regulatory framework are playing defense:
focusing on maintaining ex ante federal regulations
concerning the availability of credit to borrowers and
the appropriateness of the mortgage products offered
by lenders.
These proponents would be well served by also
devoting attention to the states. In this Issue Brief,
I show how the legal framework governing ex post
borrower protections—specifically, state foreclosure
procedures—can help address this challenging policy
problem. State legislators would do well to understand
how various foreclosure regimes across all 50 states
affect mortgage lending so that they can tailor their
state’s foreclosure regime to their state’s specific needs.
Given the deregulatory trend at the federal level,
advocates of strong regulation of lending practices

SUMMARY
• The momentum in Washington currently trends toward deregulation
of the mortgage-finance industry. Given these circumstances,
proponents of maintaining a more robust regulatory framework
should look to the power of the states, and specifically to
state-mandated judicial foreclosure.
• Judicial foreclosure, which is authorized in almost half of U.S.
states, requires that lenders seeking to foreclose on a mortgage
file an action in state court. This not only provides borrowers
with a forum for holding lenders accountable for their behavior
and obligations, but puts the onus on the lender to show that
the requirements for foreclosure have been met. It also aids
borrowers by delaying the foreclosure process and allowing
them to remain in their homes for longer periods while in default.
• New empirical research discussed in the brief indicates that
judicial foreclosure also alters lender behavior in ways that
are beneficial to borrowers, and that mirror regulatory goals.
Lenders exhibit greater caution in loan-approval decisions and
offer fewer subprime loans. These results are amplified for
lower-income borrowers.
• Importantly, the costs imposed on lenders by judicial foreclosure
do not appear to get passed on to borrowers in the form of
higher rates.
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ought to look to the states—including
to state foreclosure law as a form of ex
post mortgage-finance regulation.
Almost half of U.S. states mandate
judicial foreclosure, which requires
that lenders seeking to foreclose on
a mortgage file an action in state
court. In these states, courts provide
a forum for borrowers to challenge
both lenders’ adherence to the state’s
foreclosure procedures (the backend) and their behavior at the loan
origination stage (the front-end).
Borrowers in all states may raise a
broadly similar set of arguments, as
defenses to the lender’s foreclosure
action in judicial foreclosure states
or as causes of action in non-judicial
foreclosure states. The key difference
between the two procedures is that
judicial foreclosure places on the
lender the burden of demonstrating
that the requirements to foreclose
are met. In other states, by contrast,
the burden is on the borrower
to affirmatively file suit to claim
that the lender did not meet these
requirements.
The benefits to borrowers of
mandatory judicial foreclosure are
readily apparent. Judicial supervision
helps to ensure that lenders meet
all requirements to foreclose, and
court involvement slows down

the foreclosure process, enabling
borrowers to remain in their homes,
without making payments, for a
longer period. The costs to borrowers
of a mandatory judicial forum,
however, are contested. If the
procedure’s obvious costs to lenders
are passed on to borrowers in the
form of higher interest rates, then—
depending on one’s view of delinquent
borrowers—judicial foreclosure
either serves as an inefficient form
of insurance paid by all borrowers
(through those potentially higher
rates) to compensate unfortunate
ones or provides an unfair windfall to
irresponsible borrowers at the expense
of responsible ones.
To determine the effect of
judicial foreclosure requirements on
mortgage pricing, I compared loan
application decisions in 14 pairs of
neighboring states, where both states
have substantially similar foreclosure
procedures but for the fact that one
state mandates judicial foreclosure
and the other does not. To account
for differences in states’ real estate
markets or economies, I focused
exclusively on loan applications within
metro areas that straddle state lines
and in state border regions in these
14 pairs of states.1 To ensure that I
was comparing similar individuals

across state lines, I included a battery
of individual- and neighborhood-level
demographic variables. Finally, to
address differences in the regulatory
treatment of different lenders, I
restricted my analysis to nationally
chartered banks in 2005, because the
federal Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) was the
exclusive banking regulator of these
entities in that year.2
Judicial foreclosure affects
borrowers and lenders, and it has
implications for policymakers. To
preview the results, I find that lenders
adopt a more conservative posture in
judicial foreclosure states, exhibiting
greater caution in loan-approval
decisions, and—for those applicants
that are approved—lenders offered
fewer subprime loans. Importantly,
these results were amplified for lowerincome borrowers.
That ex post foreclosure law can
have a similar effect on lenders’
origination behavior as does ex ante
regulation should interest state
lawmakers who are concerned about
Washington’s deregulatory turn in
mortgage-finance regulation. State
governments looking to maintain
conservative lending behavior—
particularly to lower-income people—
in the face of potential federal
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deregulation should consider enacting
judicial foreclosure or otherwise
strengthening foreclosure protections.

foreclosure so as to severely discourage
the use of that procedure. These
three states can be considered de facto
judicial foreclosure states (see Figure 1).
The effects of foreclosures on
borrower behavior at the back-end
are well established. We know that
borrower protections, including
mandatory judicial foreclosure, serve

THE BASICS OF
FORECLOSURE
State law governs the foreclosure
process.3 In 2005, eighteen states

FIGURE 1 MANDATORY JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES, BY STATE
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and the District of Columbia
mandated judicial foreclosure.
Another three states—Hawaii, Iowa,
and Wisconsin—set such stringent
requirements for non-judicial

to delay, but typically not to avoid,
foreclosure.4 Additionally, some
researchers find that, by lowering the
costs to borrowers of default, these
laws can even encourage strategic

default.5 However, the manner in
which the legal environment influences
lender behavior at the front-end (i.e.,
approval decisions and the loan terms
offered) remains hotly contested, with
two competing strands of research
reaching contrary conclusions about
whether borrower protections,
including judicial foreclosure, increase
or decrease loan costs.
In addition to judicial foreclosure,
states impose a range of requirements
on lenders seeking to foreclose,
concerning (1) the number and timing
of notices that the lender must send,
(2) whether the borrower holds a
statutory right to cure the default, (3)
the length of any post-sale redemption
period, and (4) whether the lender
is permitted to pursue a post-sale
deficiency judgment, allowing it to
seize other borrower assets.6 All four
protections impose costs on lenders
and, therefore, presumably all four
could affect the market for mortgages,
as lenders change their front-end
behavior in response to back-end
borrower protections. For this reason,
I focus on borders between states
with substantially similar foreclosure
laws, with the only material difference
being the presence or absence of a
judicial foreclosure requirement.
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JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
ON-THE-GROUND
Judicial foreclosure benefits borrowers
in two respects: it provides a legal
forum for borrowers to contest
predatory loans and ensure that
lenders seeking to foreclose meet the
legal requirements to do so; it also
serves as a transfer payment, delaying
foreclosures and allowing borrowers
to remain in their homes for longer
periods while in default.
The on-the-ground consequences
of judicial versus non-judicial
foreclosure differ in at least one
important respect: the former takes
substantially longer to complete than
the latter—about 363 days longer in
2010.7 By one estimate, foreclosures
cost an average of $3,112 in judicial
foreclosure states but only $2,269 in
other states.8
The longer procedural periods
in judicial foreclosure states also
have second-order effects. Because
lenders bear the costs of delay, they
are more likely to pursue alternatives
to foreclosure—namely, negotiating
loan modifications with delinquent
borrowers—in judicial foreclosure
states.9 And the data back this up:
fewer foreclosures per default occur in
judicial foreclosure states.10

Owners of nearby properties
and municipal governments also
benefit when foreclosures are avoided.
Spillover costs—e.g., failures to
adequately maintain properties,
increased vacancy, and feelings of
decreased neighborhood stability
among residents—often accompany
foreclosures. These features tend to
lower neighborhood property values
and discourage new investment.11
Similarly, because foreclosures
reduce property tax assessments, the
decreased likelihood of foreclosure
in judicial foreclosure states benefits
municipal coffers.12
However, borrowers generally do
not avail themselves of important
rights that the judicial process affords.
One study found that only 21% of
borrowers were represented by counsel
at any point in the foreclosure process.
Only 24% of borrowers even filed
an answer. And when borrowers did
participate, they rarely alerted the
court to potential defects in lenders’
claims.13 Should such findings imply
that judicial foreclosure requirements
do not exert any effect? Probably not.
Lenders in these states could decline
to initiate foreclosure proceedings
in marginal cases in these states;
more rigorously adhere to legal
requirements at the loan origination
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stage; and tighten their lending
standards and lean towards offering
prime rather than subprime loans.
But the lack of borrower engagement,
even in judicial foreclosure states,
is unfortunate. Here is a brief
summary why.

CHALLENGES TO A
FORECLOSURE
There are six major issues that
borrowers facing foreclosure can
raise, as defenses or counterclaims in
judicial foreclosure states or as claims
in a suit filed by the borrower to
enjoin foreclosure in other states.
First, the borrower may challenge
the amount owed. In a random sample
of almost 1,000 foreclosures filed
in New York—a judicial foreclosure
state—one researcher found that
20% of borrowers claimed that the
lender failed to credit payments
received.14 Further, another study
of bankruptcy filings found that,
in 70% of bankruptcies, creditors’
assertions regarding the size of
the mortgage debt exceeded the
borrowers’ figures, whereas borrowers’
assertions exceeded creditors’ figures
in 25% of cases.15 That the borrower
self-reported greater debts than the
creditor in one-quarter of the cases
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indicates that the issue is not simply
systemic underreporting by borrowers,
but rather often reflects a genuine
uncertainty on the part of one or
both parties regarding the size of the
debt.16
Second, borrowers may utilize
state common-law doctrines—
most prominently, fraud and
unconscionability—in foreclosure
proceedings. Courts allow these claims
and defenses in a variety of situations,
including extensions of credit to lowincome borrowers for whom default
was reasonably foreseeable; rate- andterm refinances with inferior terms;
and approving loans with balloon
payments to borrowers with fixed or
declining income.
Third, where the lender provided
misinformation or failed to disclose
certain information prior to loan
origination, the Truth in Lending
Act enables the borrower, in limited
circumstances, to rescind the loan
agreement.
Fourth, the borrower may
challenge the lender’s ownership
of both the note and the mortgage
document, and, thus, the lender’s
right to foreclose. As loans are sold
and resold repeatedly, the likelihood
that the parties to these transactions
fail to properly assign the note
increases. Unsurprisingly, gaps in
the chain of title are common. One
study found that the foreclosing
entity did not show proof
of ownership of the note in
approximately 40% of a sample of
1,700 foreclosures.17 Where the
lender lacks standing based on
these defects, it cannot foreclose,
regardless of whether the borrower is
delinquent.18

Fifth, the borrower may argue
that the lender failed to properly serve
notice. Although the details differ
by state, lenders generally must send
several notices to borrowers in default
(e.g., a notice of default and notice
of foreclosure sale). Allegations that
the lender failed to serve a notice
of default were raised in 46% of the
answers filed in one sample.19
And sixth, the borrower may claim
that the documents that a lender
proffers are false or fraudulent. In
a practice known as “robo-signing,”
some lenders attempt to create a chain
of title post hoc, fraudulently creating
backdated assignments of notes. In the
wake of robo-signing scandals and,
relatedly, lenders’ inability to show
ownership of mortgages during and
after the financial crisis, three major
servicers voluntarily stayed foreclosure
sales in judicial foreclosure states.
Notably, this stay did not extend
to foreclosure sales in non-judicial
foreclosure states, indicating that
mandatory judicial process is more
effective than granting borrowers an
opt-in right to adjudicate.20
Given all of these scenarios in
which lenders either can fail to uphold
their obligations or deliberately
disadvantage borrowers, providing
borrowers with automatic access
to the judicial system by requiring
lenders to obtain judicial approval to
foreclose would seem preferable to
placing the burden on them to file
suit. But is it?

5

A CASE FOR MANDATORY
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
I set out to answer three questions.
First, since judicial foreclosure saddles
lenders with greater costs than they
otherwise would incur if permitted
to foreclose,21 are lenders less likely
to approve mortgage applicants
in judicial foreclosure states than
otherwise similar applicants in nonjudicial foreclosure states?
Second, based on the theory that
more costly judicial foreclosures may
be avoided by offering borrowers
more manageable terms, are approved
applicants less likely to be offered
subprime products in states that
mandate judicial foreclosure?
Third, are approved applicants
with lower socio-economic status
(e.g., racial or ethnic minorities or
lower-income applicants) even less
likely to be offered subprime products
in judicial foreclosure states?
On this last question, we know
that mortgage-finance outcomes are
markedly worse for African American
and Hispanic borrowers. When
minority applicants are approved, they
are substantially more likely to receive
subprime loans, even when controlling
for other borrower demographic
characteristics.22 These disparities
persist after loan origination. During
the financial crisis, the foreclosure
rates for African American and
Hispanic borrowers were 76% and
71% higher, respectively, than the rate
for non-Hispanic white borrowers.
Once again, this racial gap endures
after controlling for income and
other factors.23 We should expect the
benefits of judicial foreclosure to be
amplified for these borrowers.
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To answer these questions,
I examined lender behavior in 14
pairs of neighboring states, where one
state mandated judicial foreclosure
and the other did not.24 Importantly,
this analysis controlled for not only
the demographic characteristics of
loan applicants and those of their
communities on either side of the
state border—it also examined only
the subset of loan applications for
which the governing legal regime
(namely, mortgage-finance and
banking regulations and other aspects
of state foreclosure law) were nearly
identical in both states within each
of the 14 pairs.
This analysis revealed that the
answer to each of the three questions
is ‘yes.’ Overall, judicial foreclosure
requirements are associated with
an approximate 2.1-2.8% reduction
in the likelihood of loan approval
and, conditional on loan approval, a
0.2-1.0% reduction in the likelihood
of being offered a subprime loan.
While not monumental, reductions
of this size in a sample of 7.3 million
loan applications are noteworthy.25
Further, there is suggestive evidence
that these effects are amplified for
lower-income borrowers, although
I do not find more pronounced
effects for racial or ethnic minority
borrowers. Finally, the notion that
lenders “pass on the costs” of this
borrower protection in the form of
higher rates is firmly rejected.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
With the post-financial crisis turn
towards federalism in consumer
protection law,26 and more recent
cracks in the federal banking
regulatory infrastructure, policymakers
need a firm grasp of the effects of
foreclosure law on housing finance
markets. Specifically, they should
understand that judicial foreclosure
can serve a similar function as ex ante
regulation.27
The prospect that a lender seeking
to foreclose on a mortgage may be
penalized for its earlier behavior may
incent the lender to alter its behavior
at the loan origination stage, taking
greater care to abide by the Truth in
Lending Act and other laws. Lenders
also may take greater care not to
engage in lending practices—like
offering balloon payments to lowincome borrowers—that increase
the likelihood of default. In this
way, borrower protections at the
foreclosure stage may function as
a form of back-end regulation of
mortgage lending.
Here, there is a clear role for
states to play. Although historically
states have been reluctant to switch
foreclosure regimes, there is now a
compelling case that borrowers (and
local communities) fare better when
the legal burden to file suit falls to
lenders. On the one hand, judicial
foreclosure adds to state courts’

6

dockets and increases lenders’ costs
by allowing borrowers to remain
in their homes for longer. On the
other hand, it provides a way for
state legislatures to help some of
their most economically vulnerable
citizens and communities. That
judicial foreclosure can be established
at the state level, without the need
for buy-in from federal banking
and consumer financial protection
regulators, should be particularly
attractive for states looking to alter
lender behavior—especially subprime
lending to lower-income borrowers—
at a time when federal regulators may
be going in retreat. Regardless of how
one weighs these considerations, given
the importance of mortgage-finance
to the overall economy and the
psychological value that Americans
place on homeownership, the stakes
are too high not to appreciate the
effects of judicial foreclosure laws on
mortgage lending.
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